William Blake and the Bible: Reading and Writing the Law by Farrell, Michael
 
 
 
Title William Blake and the Bible: Reading and Writing the Law 
Author Michael Farrell 
Publication FORUM: University of Edinburgh Postgraduate Journal of Culture and the Arts 
Issue Number 03 
Issue Date Autumn 2006 
Publication Date 12/12/2006 
Editors Claire Altree & Keith Brown  
 
FORUM claims non-exclusive rights to reproduce this article electronically (in full or in part) and to publish this 
work in any such media current or later developed. The author retains all rights, including the right to be 
identified as the author wherever and whenever this article is published, and the right to use all or part of the 
article and abstracts, with or without revision or modification in compilations or other publications. Any latter 
publication shall recognise FORUM as the original publisher. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Edinburgh  
Postgraduate Journal of Culture and the Arts 
Issue 03 | Autumn 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
William Blake and the Bible: Reading and Writing the Law
Michael Farrell, University of Oxford
Blake’s attitude towards the Bible was ambivalent. He believed it was at once revelatory 
in its prophetic mode and yet repressive in its espousal of the Moral Law – the Mosaic 
Law or Decalogue. His radical aesthetic challenges the notion that the Bible, as the 
embodiment of the Law, is a semantically stable and formally unified text which contains 
a single, infallible meaning. The Bible, despite being the Law, is not subject to the laws 
or conventions of reading and writing which promote a single, authoritative voice or 
textual presence. Blake’s poems similarly challenge the notion of reading and writing as 
creative acts bound by formal and institutional laws and conventions.   
Samuel Beckett notes an etymological connection between the origin of the word 
law and the act of reading in the evolution of the Latin word lex (Beckett 11). The word 
lex originally meant a crop of acorns and its correlative verb legere meant to gather 
(acorns). Gradually, lex came to mean a gathering of peoples into an assembly – a 
political or legal assembly – and hence law; and the verb legere came to mean a gathering 
of letters into a word, to read. In the light of the notion that the Bible promotes 
unbounded reading, it is necessary to consider to what extent the activity of reading and 
interpretation is bound by law and convention. 
For Owen Fiss, reading is a circumscribed, law-bound act which can be measured 
against a set of norms made possible by “disciplining rules” (Fiss 744). Interpretation is 
not predetermined by a source external to the interpreter but is constrained “by a set of 
rules that specify the relevance and weight to be assigned to the material…as well as…
the procedural circumstances under which the interpretation can occur” (Fiss 744). The 
disciplining rules, which constrain the reader, function to transform the act of reading 
from a subjective into an objective process and constitute the principle of right reading or 
the “standards by which the correctness of the interpretation is to be judged” (Fiss 744). 
The idea that readers internalise certain codes, conventions and laws of reading 
relates to the notion of literary competence. For Jonathan Culler readers do not approach 
a text without an “implicit understanding of the operations of literary discourse which 
tells one what to look for” (Culler 113-114). Texts have meaning only in relation to the 
system of codes and conventions of reading that the reader has assimilated so that “To 
read a text as literature is not to make one’s mind a tabula rasa and approach it without 
preconceptions” (114). For example, in his analysis of Blake’s poem entitled ‘Ah! Sun-
flower’, Culler observes that there are certain conventions operative in reading poetry 
which tell the reader what to look for, such as the “rule of significance…metaphorical 
coherence” and the “convention of thematic unity” (115). Readers acquire a literary 
competence through the assimilation of certain laws and modes of reading so that reading 
is “a rule-governed process of producing meanings…which both makes possible 
invention and imposes limits on it” (126). Reading, then, involves the reader in the 
production of meaning, though reading is principally a disciplined activity governed by 
normative principles and conventions that, in turn, form the “constraints of the institution 
of literature” (116).
Reading practices are controlled by the literary institution. The conventions of 
poetry are constituents of the institution of literature and so it is misleading to discuss 
individual poems as autonomous, organic unities complete in themselves existing outside 
the literary institution. S. H. Olsen defines an institution as “a set of constitutive rules” 
(Olsen 196). He suggests that the aesthetic properties of a text are determined by these 
rules or formal laws and have no relevance outside of the institution in which they 
function. The text is an “institutional transaction” (22); its meaning is defined by 
institutional conventions that enable the reader to identify its aesthetic properties so that 
to interpret a text is to understand its properties and how they conduce to its meaning 
within the field of literary criticism. This process is made possible by the literary 
institution that at once regulates, codifies, legitimises reading as a social and critical 
practice.
The idea of legislation involved in the act of reading inevitably raises the issue of 
authority and authorship. In the twentieth century, a number of theorists replaced the 
Wordsworthian concept of the author as an authoritative, omniscient presence with the 
notion that the author is an absence, a hypothetical and linguistic construct. For instance, 
in his seminal essay ‘The Death of the Author’, Roland Barthes asserts that the author as 
an origin, an anterior presence and authority, is undermined through the very act of 
writing. The author is, in effect, already written, a “ready-formed dictionary” (Barthes 
147). The singular voice of the author is unheard amidst the babble of diverse discourses 
that comprise the “stereophonic plurality” (159) of the text.
Barthes believes that a text is composed of multiple writings focused ultimately 
upon the reader so that the text, its meaning and its unity, inheres “not in its origin but in 
its destination” (148). This notion undermines the autonomy of the Author-God. The 
reader is the textual space in which the multiple writings converge so that the writer is 
erased, written out of the text whereas the reader is inscribed, written into the text. In the 
“multiplicity of writing, everything is to be disentangled, nothing deciphered” (147); 
meaning cannot be anchored to an ultimate signified. The stereographic text liberates 
reading so that to refuse to fix meaning is to “refuse God and his hypostases – reason, 
science, law”. The death of the Author-God as law-maker is an affirmation of textual 
jouissance – of the free play of the signifier – and, moreover, heralds the birth of the 
reader as law-breaker.  
Valentine Cunningham states that the rejection of “real authors, as origins for 
utterances and texts is explicitly, in the case of Barthes…part of a strong ultimate 
rejection of the existence and authority of God as author and origin” (Cunningham 16). In 
relation to Blake, Jon Mee writes: “At the root of Blake’s attitude to the Bible lies a 
hostility to the very notion of the pure text…to the notion of a text which claims a 
transcendent authority” (Mee 11-12). According to Blake, the signifier ‘God’ or the Word 
had an origin or fixed signified until the rise of Priesthood which sought to abstract the 
mental concept of God from its object (see The Marriage of Heaven and Hell in Erdman 
38-39). This conception of God as an abstract entity – a floating signifier without a 
signified – is oppressive. Narratives and ideations that abstract their form from their 
origin – the Poetic Genius – and so divorce the sign from the signified are those in the 
service of the oppressive Church and State which utilise abstract conceptions of God, 
morality and Law for their own ideologically hegemonic ends; an ideology which Blake 
associated with abstract reasoning, as well as the classical poets, and which he considered 
to be a form of allegorizing. For Blake, allegory is potentially an oppressive form of 
poetry in that it may be serviceable to those in power that maintain ideological hegemony 
through the foregrounding of the immutable signified.
Allegory presupposes a stable relationship between sign and signification. For 
Blake, it is “the poetry of moral virtues” (Mee 12) – that is, the Scripture of the Law and 
the Decalogue. In his A Vision of the Last Judgement, he asserts that “The Hebrew Bible 
and the Gospel of Jesus are not Allegory” (Erdman 554). For him, the meaning of the 
Bible lies hidden beneath the surface of the text and is to be revealed via a process of 
critical, active reading; it is a Sublime Allegory in the sense that it is not composed of 
abstract ideations but rather contains narratives which allude to a specific historical 
reality; a reality which operates as a mythic paradigm and which repeats itself throughout 
history. Narratives based in the past “are used prophetically to bring the past…to bear 
upon a situation located in the present” (Tannenbaum 117). Indeed, this notion of Biblical 
narratives as exempla, proleptically or prophetically signifying the future, is referred to as 
typology and relates to Blake’s conception of Christ as a type, an exemplum, in his 
fulfilment of the Mosaic Law: “I cannot conceive the Divinity of the…Bible to consist 
either in who they were written by or at what time or on the historical evidence which 
may be all false…but in the Sentiments & Examples” (Erdman 618).
Tannenbaum observes that in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell “the 
disagreement between the Angel and the Devil centers (sic) around the issue of the sense 
in which Christ is a fulfilment of the Law” (Tannenbaum 115). The Angel perceives 
Christ to be the fulfilment of the Law in terms of being the culmination of a historical, 
typological process. The Devil, on the contrary, perceives Christ’s fulfilment of the Law 
to be perpetually renewed throughout history in different manifestations and in different 
historical contexts. Christ represents not the culmination but rather a specific stage within 
the redemption narrative of history. Christ is a type or paradigm of the regenerative 
process – of self-annihilation – which Man must emulate in order to enter the Divine 
Humanity or body of Christ.  Blake utilizes types in his poetry. His characters are 
composite, multi-faceted, consisting of a number of types, such as Los in The Book of  
Urizen who, as Tannenbaum notes, signifies at once Jehovah, Adam, Abraham, Apollo, 
Jupiter and many more historical figures or types that inhabit a specific historical reality 
(see Tannenbaum 117). In this way, Blake’s types are multi-form, multivalent, and so 
ambivalent. Ambivalence in Blake’s poetry functions to engage the reader on an 
imaginative, typological and subjective level and to challenge the disciplining rules of 
right reading – that is, by rousing the reader’s faculty of interpretation to engage 
imaginatively with the characters on multiple levels as representatives of the past, present 
and future in the sense that “typology posits a vertical view of history in which events are 
not related to each other chronologically…but thematically” (118). Indeed, the visionary 
reader is roused into action becoming an active agent of the Word, not a passive hearer, in 
the sense that Christ “acted from impulse: not from rules” (Erdman 43) and embodied the 
dictum “be ye doers of the word, and not hearers” (The Holy Bible: King James Version, 
James 1: 22). 
As Cunningham observes, I Peter 2: 21, describes Christ as exemplum, a type; a 
text, a piece of writing (For to this you were called, because Christ also suffered for us, 
leaving us an example, that you should follow His steps). He argues that, in this context, 
Christ as a type or example is a hupogrammos – that is, “that line of writing written out 
by the Greek schoolboy at the top of the schoolboy’s wax writing tablet for him to keep 
copying out as handwriting practice” (18-19). The hupogrammos included all the letters 
of the Greek alphabet so that Christ is envisioned as an alphabetic, textual entity – “the 
whole of language’s potential” (19) – and the entire alphabet from alpha to omega. 
Cunningham notes that the hupogrammos was frequently a sentence comprising 
neologisms composed by the schoolmaster for practice in the formation of letters as 
opposed to the study of their sense. In this way Christ as a text – a hupogrammos – 
becomes a mishmash of letters, of nonce-formations, of non-sense words so that he is 
non-referential, multivalent, a set of graphic and semantic traces. 
Derridean poststructuralism promotes the idea that any text is composite of verbal 
and semantic traces which elude a transcendental signified. It foregrounds what is 
expressly ‘literary’ about literature so that the term ‘literature’ is endowed with authority 
and so capable of destabilising the logocentric discourses and institutions from which it 
originates. For Derrida, the ‘law’ of literature, its literariness is, in fact, its inherent 
lawlessness: literature inherently defies, destabilises and deconstructs the institutional and 
logocentric Law of Literature and so, in a similar fashion, the figure of Christ as 
hupogrammos promotes textual pluralism in order to oppose the logocentric hegemony of 
the Word. For Cunningham, Christ-as-text signifies the concept of logocentrism as the 
foregrounding of multivalent textuality; of the interweaving of multiple voices in the text; 
of Christ as the ultimate polysemous sign, signifier or semeion (20). As hupogrammos, 
the body of Christ is a body of letters, a gathering of words (legere), and so replaces the 
singular, monologic and oppressive Word of God. Christ is a body, a text, and so 
represents an anthropomorphic conception of textuality which is germane to Blake’s 
conception of art in bodily terms: “The head Sublime, the heart Pathos, the genitals 
beauty, the hands and feet Proportion” (Erdman 37). For Blake, the Word of God as 
incarnate in Christ represents not homology but plurality. It manifests itself typologically 
throughout history and therefore its meaning is not fixed and immutable but rather it is 
infinitely renewable – “Its Eternal Image & Individuality never dies but renews by its 
seed just as the Imaginative Image returns according to the seed of Contemplative 
Thought” (Erdman 555); it is an ever-present, ever-changing signifier within the 
synchronic present and not a fixed, static signified anchored to a specific historical or 
diachronic moment. 
The opposition between signifier and signified and the hegemony implicit in the 
reification of the sign is dramatized in The Book of Los. In the poem “the rock of 
eternity” (Erdman 92) that incarcerates Los – and is symbolic of the Mosaic Law – is 
replaced by him with the sun that he fashions. The sun is, according to Tannenbaum, an 
icon of natural religion that signifies “the worship of the finite world that the sun 
inscribes and whose materialistic premises…establish the hegemony of the Law” 
(Tannenbaum 279). The sun is false icon, a false signifier divorced from its signified – 
that is, God – and so it is falsely reified, falsely worshipped. This notion of iconoclasm, 
of false worship, relates to Jean Baudrillard’s concept of simulacra – “the generation by 
models of a real without origin or reality” (Baudrillard 1) – which is an ersatz object, 
icon, or signified. For Blake, natural reason separates the signifier and the signified so 
that the object of worship is a mental deity abstracted from its referent. It is fashioned as 
an object of Mystery – that is, it is merely an empty, non-referential sign and so it has 
meaning merely as an object or icon. In the poem, then, the sun represents a deified 
simulacrum, a false idol and object of worship so that the Law, as an abstract system of 
moral codes derived from the object of worship, is itself a simulacrum, a hyper-real, a 
model without an origin or reality. 
Blake was wholly averse to the regulation of ideology via closed texts and so his 
radical aesthetic promotes polysemous textuality which requires an active and subjective 
mode of reading unconstrained by disciplining rules. He states that “that which can be 
made Explicit to the Idiot is not worth my care” and that the best kind of writing is that 
which “rouzes the faculties to act” (Erdman 702). Indeed, Blake endeavoured to subvert 
and transcend repressive, conventional and disciplining paradigms of reading by 
positioning the reader centripetally to the text. Oppressive reading is associated with 
passivity, objectivity, and the disciplining rules of logocentric, institutionalised literature 
disseminated by repressive and hegemonic forces. On the other hand, radical or lawless 
reading is associated with mental fight, subjectivity, and the death of the Author as a 
consequence of what Barthes calls the foregrounding of the anti-logocentric, 
stereographic plurality of the text. 
Saree Makdisi argues that Blake’s illuminated works, like the Bible, signify via 
thematic, conceptual and aesthetic interrelations not only within a single text but across 
multiple texts and moreover, not only in words but in images, and so require constant acts 
of rereading. He writes: “Much of the experience of reading one of the illuminated 
books…involves alternating between reading words and reading images, and turning 
back and forth through the plates, tracing and retracing different interpretive paths” 
(Makdisi 112). This sense of reading and re-reading disrupts the notion of a linear 
chronology and so necessitates a form of spatial reading and, in this sense, the meaning 
of the poems emerge from the multiple modes of reading they require. For Blake, radical 
reading involves Imagination or Vision – a renewed mode of perception – which 
challenges prescriptive modes of right reading and the assimilated literary competence of 
the reader. Blake’s use of multi-media, that is, the interplay of words, sounds and images 
in his poetry, opens up a textual space in which diverse, often contradictory meanings are 
invoked, subsequently rousing the reader’s faculties to actively engage dialogically with 
the text. For instance, Blake’s illustration on plate 24 of The Marriage of Heaven and 
Hell depicts a subterranean locus inhabited by an anguished, aged, Urizenic figure 
crawling beast-like on his hands and knees and is, furthermore, reminiscent of Blake’s 
1795 print, ‘Nebuchadnezzar’. The illustration signifies contrapuntally to the written text 
on the plate, which concerns the conversion of the Angel to a Devil in reading the Bible 
in its “diabolical” or unconventional sense. Beneath the illustration are the words “One 
Law for the Lion & Ox is Oppression”. The image, in the context of the written text, is 
multivalent – unanchored by the written text – and so invites a plurality of readings. The 
figure may signify the Natural Man who “receiveth not the things of the Spirit” (The 
Holy Bible: King James Version, 1 Cor. 2: 14), who reads the Bible in its literal and non-
diabolical sense, and who is earth-bound by the five senses; or it may signify the tyrant 
oppressor who is bound by his own inflexible Moral Law. In this way, Blake challenges 
prescriptive modes of right reading.   
Blake’s poetic may be said to be radical in the sense that it challenges and 
subverts the ideologies and conventions of classical and neo-classical aesthetic paradigms 
which privilege the propriety of poetic form or, in Blake’s terms, Mathematical Form, 
over matter or content (see Roston 15-42). Tannenbaum writes: “The subordination of the 
general to the particular, with a reliance upon internal coherence among the arts rather 
than upon an externally imposed order” (Tannenbaum 25) was the aesthetic principle that 
Blake saw to be operating within the Bible. Blake was opposed to formalism in the sense 
of an externally imposed unity in a work of art. For him, the formal unity as well as the 
semantic coherence of the text – its Living Form – inheres in its synthesis of the 
particular with the general; in the internal unity of the parts as opposed to an externally 
and imposed order: “when a Work has Unity it is as much in a Part as in the Whole” 
(Erdman 269-270). As Tannenbaum notes, this aesthetic principle is identifiable in the 
Scriptures. He states that “In biblical poetry…form is subordinated to significance” 
(Tannenbaum 26). The fundamental unit of Hebrew verse is the self-contained distich of 
parallel lines which embodies a concrete, vivid and precise image. Hebrew verse verges 
on the prosaic in its foregrounding of sense as opposed to structure. It employs “a 
flexible, undulatory rhythm produced neither by syllabic quantity nor accentuation, but 
by the antiphonal sense-pattern of the passage” (Roston 23). The meaning and the unity 
of Hebrew verse resides in the semantic juxtaposition of parallel lines; in the particular as 
opposed to the general; in its self-contained internal semantic units as opposed to an 
overriding externally imposed formal structure. Blake’s poetry is similarly asymmetrical 
and anti-linear, relying upon an internal unity of semantic elements for its structure and 
coherence. 
For instance, in America Blake commingles tenses and thus disrupts the 
chronological flow of the narrative. He employs anthropomorphic synaesthesia (“the 
hungry wind”, “loud winds”, “angry shores”) in order to engender a notion of semantic 
multi-dimensionality and dynamically deploys various symbols (such as fire, clouds, 
fetters) in various semantic contexts (“fiery joy”, “lustful fire”), thereby achieving a sense 
of textual unity and coherence through sense and symbol as opposed to structure. The 
principle of parallelism is exemplified in plate 8 lines 5-6 (“That stony law I stamp to 
dust; and scatter religion abroad/To the four winds as a torn book, & none shall gather the 
leaves”). The stony law of ecclesiastical theology is initially associated with the 
Decalogue – the stone tablets of the Law – and these are subsequently assimilated with 
writing – with scripture (from the Latin scribere, to write) – and the tyranny of the 
written word. The change in association is implicit in the verb “stamp” which connotes 
the stamping or printing of words. Moreover the verb “scatter” initially refers to religion 
– here used as a metonym for the Law – and it precedes the qualifying simile “as a torn 
book”. The metaphorical association between religion and the Law is proleptically 
signified in the verb “scatter” which precedes the actual metaphor; a metaphor which is at 
once figurative in that the dissipation of religion is associated with the scattering of 
leaves from a book; and literal in that the religious law is a written Law. This dynamic 
use of metaphor is carried across the distich. The second line expands upon and qualifies 
the meaning of the first line, subsequently achieving a unity and expansion of sense as 
opposed to a unity of structure. As previously noted, the relationship between law and 
literature is etymological and, in this context, the word for law, lex, refers to the act of 
writing, that is, the gathering of letters in a word, into a sentence. 
The concept of genre is related to the idea of legislation in that it implies an 
institutionalised system of classification, a standard or norm by which to judge literary 
works. Tzvetan Todorov observes that in the classical period literary critics sought to 
prescribe generic laws and manifested a “penalising tendency” (Todorov 138) to judge 
works according to those laws. The individual work was judged in relation to a general 
system, a general law of genre or, alternatively, in relation to a generic standard – a 
canon, from kaneh, meaning measuring rod – such as tragedy. Indeed, any text relies 
upon its participation within a general system for its readability. To be interpretable, a 
text must belong to a genre, a set of formal conventions, serving as “a norm or 
expectation to guide the reader in his encounter with the text” (Culler 136). Genres, then, 
provide a system of codes and conventions for reading a text. A genre at once enables and 
limits reading, constraining it to a specific function, type, or genre of reading already 
implicit in the laws it prescribes so that the law of genre legislates the reading act. 
The Bible is generically hybrid. It is “a pattern of commandments, aphorisms, 
epigrams, proverbs, parables, riddles, pericopes, parallel couplets, formulaic phrases, 
folktales, oracles, epiphanies” and is composed of “snippets from historical documents, 
laws, letters, sermons, hymns” and so on (Frye The Great Code 206). In this sense it does 
not have a formal unity but rather a unity of content or a unifying vision – an 
“imaginative unity” (218) – and it is in this sense that, for Blake, the Bible is Sublime. 
Given that the Bible has multiple authors and, given that it is an aggregate text formed 
over many years and, despite the fact that it contains a number of Laws or 
commandments, the claim to authority that it has is essentially one of Vision. Its meaning 
is polysemous, not in the sense that it contains multiple significations, which would 
imply that the meaning of the text is arbitrary; but rather in the sense that its significance 
may be apprehended on a number of levels – that is, literal, moral, allegorical, and 
anagogical (220-221).  In The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Blake refers to the 
composition of his illuminated books as the “infernal method” of printing which melts 
away the apparent surface of the text, exposing to the reader “the infinite which was hid” 
in the multiple layers or levels of meaning (Erdman 39). He promotes the notion of 
infernal writing and infernal reading; a mode of reading which sees beyond the mere 
superficies of the text.   
The Marriage of Heaven and Hell is a composite work, which may be 
apprehended on a number of levels, hybridizing a number of genres and literary modes, 
synthesizing argument, and narrative, and so challenging the reader’s literary competence 
or their assimilation of institutionally prescribed modes of reading. It is essentially 
structured on the concept of contrariety, of “opposed voices” (Miller 495). Blake presents 
arguments from contrasting points of view, often with an ironic tone, so that there is no 
stable, singular, authoritative voice in the text. In this way, the authorial voice of The 
Marriage is multiple or polyvocal; there is no overriding presence of the author in the 
text and so it may be said that the text is decentralised or depersonalized – not in the 
sense that there is no authorial personality or in the sense that the perspective of the text 
is essentially an objective one, but rather in the sense that there is no singular personality, 
no identifiable authorial voice but a conflict of voices which constitutes the stereographic 
plurality of the text. Blake, like the Hebrew poets, diverts his attention away from 
himself-as-poet towards himself-as-prophet – that is, towards his subject matter – and 
consequently achieves a condition of depersonalization, ultimately by “transmuting 
passions without obtruding his own personality upon them” (Roston 27). This dialogic 
mode is necessary to engage the reader with the text. Without dialogue or contraries there 
is no progression towards Vision.
In his poetry “Blake is constantly seeking to break down the notion of scripture as 
monolithic authority” (Mee 14). The Book of Urizen, for example, exists in multiple 
versions, each with varying configurations of the plates and none providing a sense of 
narrative cohesion or continuity, which, in the words of W. J. T. Mitchell, “suggests that 
this atemporal, antisequential quality is a deliberate formal device” (Mitchell 137).  The 
poem is intentionally unstable, fragmentary, and so multivalent and engages in 
contemporary discourses surrounding the state of Biblical texts. Jerome McGann argues 
that the poem is a direct response to the new developments in contemporary Biblical and 
textual studies, most notably the theory of Biblical texts known as ‘the fragment 
hypothesis’ expounded by Alexander Geddes: in the poem “the textual anomalies are 
structural; they are part of a deliberate effort to critique the received Bible and its 
traditional exegetes from the point of view of the latest research findings of the new 
historical philology” (McGann 324). Geddes argued that the Bible, as a conglomerate text 
derived from multiple sources, is a heteroglot work or, in Bakhtin’s terms, a polyglossia, 
and subsequently does not convey any single, pure, original inspiration or historical, 
political, or theological viewpoint. If we follow this argument the Bible, then, does not 
have a single Author and so it cannot claim to be the voice of a single authority whereas 
Biblical scholars previously held that God was the single Author of Creation and of the 
Word. For Blake, the notion of textual monologism – of a singular voice or viewpoint and 
authority which denies that there exists outside of it another consciousness (see Bakhtin 
79-85) – is a manifestation of the hegemony of the written word in precluding the 
possibility of diverse readings. Blake’s textual mode, as seen in The Marriage of Heaven 
and Hell, is essentially dialogic or polysemic and subverts the hegemony of the 
authoritative, monologic text. 
The Book of Urizen imitates the textuality of the Bible so that to read the poem “is 
to discover a Bible one had never known before; it is to learn to read the traditional Bible 
in an entirely new way” (Mc Gann 324). Blake’s conception of myth or narrative is 
similar to and may derive from the neoteric notions of textuality espoused by Robert 
Lowth and others in their Biblical hermeneutics in the mid to late eighteenth century. 
Blake perceived that all sacred texts are comprised of mythologues or poetic tales which 
have their provenance in the Poetic Genius and which encode and reflect certain 
culturally specific ideologies. The Bible does not comprise a seamless, coherent 
narrative, or a single, all-embracing ideology; rather, it is replete with textual ruptures, 
gashes and inconsistencies, semantic lacunae, reiterated passages; it is fissiparous, 
fragmented, and inaccessible to Reason; it is a Bible of Hell per se. Indeed, the Bible is 
“the product of a complex, continuous, and often arbitrary set of historical interactions” 
(320); it is “a heterogeneous collection of various materials gathered together at different 
times by different editors and redactors” (321) and derives from a number of cultures, 
traditions, literary and historical contexts. 
The canonisation of texts potentially results in the institutional control of 
interpretation. The word ‘canon’ etymologically derives from a Semitic word meaning 
reed that is in Hebrew kaneh, meaning a measuring rod – a rule, a standard or norm. The 
literary canon “controls the texts a culture takes seriously” and so disciplines “the 
methods of interpretation that establish the meaning of ‘serious’” (Altien 42). Bloom 
states that “A canonical reading…attempts to stop the mind by making a text redundantly 
identical with itself, so as to produce a total presence, an unalterable meaning” (Bloom 
Poetry and Repression 29). Canonical texts, then, are models of authority and represent a 
standard by which to judge all other texts and how they are to be read. The etymological 
connection between kanon – meaning a reed – and the literary canon (and the 
implications the word has for conventional reading) is perhaps implied in Blake’s use of 
homophony in the Introduction to Songs of Innocence: 
Piper sit thee down and write
In a book that all may read – 
So he vanish’d from my sight
And I pluck’d a hollow reed (Erdman 7)
As well as subverting canonic or regulated modes of reading, Blake opposed the notion 
of the established literary canon. In his Preface to Milton, he vociferously asserts that 
“We do not want either Greek or Roman Models if we are but just and true to our own 
Imagination” (Erdman 95). Eric Chandler notes that here Blake is opposing the 
conventions and laws of literary composition derived from the classics, subsequently 
ingrained in literary tradition, which Blake, Shakespeare and Milton were constrained by, 
and which comprise the literary canon (see Chandler 71). Blake demands that the revised 
canon should consist of “those Grand Works of the more ancient & consciously & 
professedly Inspired Men” (Erdman 95) – that is, the “Sublime of the Bible” – which, 
unlike the typical objective detachment from life of the classical poets, places an 
emphasis on subjective emotion, on matter not metre, on function not form.  
Blake associated Memory with traditional, canonical, classical aesthetics – “The 
Stolen and Perverted Writings of Homer and Ovid: of Plato and Cicero” – and set it in 
opposition to Inspiration which constitutes the Sublime of the Bible. He envisioned 
artistic freedom from the constraints of classical models based on reason and convention 
and so the triumph of Imagination – which unlike fallen Reason is the means by which 
the poet conveys Vision through Inspiration – over Memory, using the Bible as a literary 
model. The liberty of the Imagination entails a rejection of all aesthetic paradigms which 
constrain Vision.  Chandler observes that the substitution of the Bible for classical 
aesthetic paradigms results in contradiction. He states that “Blake manoeuvres around 
this problem, however, by suggesting that there is a difference between the model that 
inhibits or contains the artist and the inspiration that stimulates and expands the 
imagination” (Chandler 71). The Bible as a literary model may be equally oppressive to 
the creative Imagination, depending on how it is read – that is, critically or uncritically, 
actively or passively, diabolically or conventionally. The Bible is an embodiment of the 
Moral Law, and it is also canonic. Blake challenges the canonicity of the Bible by reading 
it infernally; by reading Christ as a polyvalent sign: hupogrammos, that is, Christ, the 
Word, as an anti-logocentric, anti-hegemonic incarnation of textual stereography; a 
revolutionary figure who “acted from impulse: not from rules” (Erdman 43). Blake 
believed that the Bible is true Inspiration in cleansing the doors of perception and, 
subsequently, in its ability to rouse the artist and reader to realize the creative potential of 
his poetic/prophetic Imagination. 
For Blake, then, the Bible, despite being the Moral Law, is “a Poem of probable 
impossibilities, fabricated…by Inspiration…Poetry & that poetry inspired” (Erdman 616-
617). It is the great code or instructive paradigm of art which enables him to synthesise 
his political and theological outlook into a coherent, creative Vision. In his poetry he is 
preoccupied with “the opposition between scripture, represented as an oppressive mode 
of writing which is associated with the law, and poetry, a mode of writing which is open, 
multi-form, and seeks the imaginative participation of the reader” (Mee 12). In this light, 
Blake’s radical aesthetic, derived from the Scriptures, challenges textual logocentricity 
and the idea that the Author-God of the text is an infallible presence. Blake also 
challenged the idea that there are certain conventions or laws of reading and writing a 
text which prescribe the reader’s literary competence. Blake, on the other hand, envisaged 
the Bible as a paradigm for lawless or diabolical reading and writing. In opposition to 
institutionalised forms of reading and writing, he promotes in his poetry the primacy of 
subjective reading and the active role of the reader in challenging prescriptive, law-bound 
and objective modes of reading and interpretation governed by institutionalised 
conventions or disciplining rules. 
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